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Abstract
We study a round-robin tournament with n symmetric players where in each of the n￿1 stages each
of the players competes against a di⁄erent player in the Tullock contest. Each player has a limited budget
of e⁄ort that decreases within the stages proportionally to the e⁄ort he exerted in the previous stages.
We show that when the prize for winning (value of winning) is equal between the stages, a player￿ s e⁄ort
is weakly decreasing over the stages. We also show how the contest designer can in￿ uence the players￿
allocation of e⁄ort by changing the distribution of prizes between the stages. In particular, we analyze
the distribution of prizes over the stages that balance the e⁄ort allocation such that a player exerts the
same e⁄ort over the di⁄erent stages. In addition, we analyze the distribution of prizes over the stages
that maximizes the players￿expected total e⁄ort.
1 Introduction
The elimination tournament and the round-robin tournament are two common examples of multi-stage
tournaments. In the elimination tournament, teams or individual players play pair-wise matches. The
winner advances to the next round while the loser is eliminated from the competition. In the round-robin
tournament, on the other hand, every individual player or team competes against all the others where in
every stage a player plays a pair-wise match against a di⁄erent opponent. Sportive events are commonly
organized either as elimination tournaments (the ATP tennis tournaments), or as round-robin tournaments
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1(professional football and basketball leagues) or as a combination of a round-robin tournament in the ￿rst
part of the season and then as an elimination tournament in the second part (US-Basketball, NCAA College
Basketball, the FIFA (soccer) World Cup Playo⁄s, the UEFA Champions￿League).
The elimination tournament structure has been widely analyzed in the literature on contests. Rosen
(1986) studied an elimination tournament with homogeneous players where the probability of winning a
match is a stochastic function of the players￿e⁄orts. In particular, he analyzed the e⁄ect of the allocation of
prizes on the players￿allocation of e⁄ort. Gradstein and Konrad (1999) studied a rent-seeking contest ￿ la
Tullock (with homogenous players) and found that simultaneous contests are strictly superior to elimination
tournaments if the contest￿ s rules are discriminatory enough (as in an all-pay auction).1 Groh et al. (2009)
studied an elimination tournament with four asymmetric players where players are matched in the all-pay
auction in each of the stages. Their analysis indicates that for the Gradstein-Konrad result to hold it is
necessary that the multistage contest induces a positive probability that the two strongest players do not
reach the ￿nal with probability one. If the two strongest players do reach the ￿nal with a positive probabil-
ity, the elimination tournament has several advantages over other multi-stage tournaments particularly the
simultaneous contest.
In contrast to elimination tournaments, the literature on round-robin tournaments seems to be quite
sparse.2 This paper attempts to ￿ll this gap by studying a round-robin tournament with n symmetric players
(teams) where in each of the n￿1 stages, each of the players competes against a di⁄erent player in the Tullock
contest. Each player has a limited budget of e⁄ort that decreases within the stages proportionally to the
e⁄ort he exerted in the previous stages, where for each e⁄ort unit that a player exerts, he loses ￿;0 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1
units of e⁄ort from his budget.
One of the main questions in multi-stage tournaments particularly in round-robin tournaments, is how
the players￿e⁄ort will be allocated over the di⁄erent stages of the tournament and how the contest designer
can in￿ uence this allocation. The contest theory literature o⁄ers di⁄erent opinions about whether or not
1Harbaugh and Klumpp (2005) studied an elimination tournament with two types of players (strong and weak) where players
are matched in the Tullock contest in every stage, but there is a resource constraint for the total e⁄ort.
2Ryvkin and Ortman (2008) studied a model of a noisy tournament by which they compared the predictive power of the
simultaneous, elimination and round-robin tournaments.
2players strategically allocate their e⁄ort in multi-stage tournaments. Ferrall and Smith (1999) used data from
professional sport leagues in the US to show that teams do not strategically allocate their e⁄ort but actually
exert as much e⁄ort as possible in each of the stages. On the other hand, Amegashie et al. (2007) as well
as Matros (2006) showed that if players have ￿xed equal resources they spend more resources in the initial
rounds than in the following ones. Likewise, Harbaugh and Klump (2005) showed in a two-stage tournament
that weak players exert more e⁄ort in the ￿rst stage (semi-￿nal) whereas strong players save more e⁄ort for
the second stage (￿nal). In our round-robin tournament we also ￿nd that a player strategically allocates his
e⁄ort. In particular, when the prize for winning (value of winning) is equal between the stages, a player￿ s
e⁄ort is weakly decreasing over the stages, while if the value of ￿ is su¢ ciently high (high fatigue) a player
exerts the same level of e⁄ort in the ￿rst stages and from some stage on his e⁄ort decreases over the stages.
Moreover, for ￿ ￿ 0:5, independent of the number of players (stages), the players exert the same e⁄ort over
the ￿rst n￿2 stages but exert a smaller e⁄ort in the last stage. We also show that the smaller the value of ￿
(fatigue), the smaller is the number of ￿rst stages in which the players exert the same e⁄ort. The intuition
for this is clear since when fatigue is smaller a player has less incentive to save e⁄ort for the next stages and
then he exerts the highest possible e⁄ort according to his budget of e⁄ort in every stage of the tournament.3
We further show that the players￿allocation of e⁄ort can be in￿ uenced by the contest designer if he
changes the distribution of prizes among the stages. If the contest designer wishes to balance the e⁄ort
allocation such that a player will exert the same e⁄ort over all the stages, he should award the same prize
for all the stages except the ￿nal stage in which the designer should award a higher prize. The intuition
for this result is that by awarding a large prize in the last stage, the players have incentive to save e⁄ort in
the previous stages for the competition in the last stage since winning in the last stage is very pro￿table.
An interesting point is that in our model there is only one allocation of prizes that yields a balanced e⁄ort
allocation. This allocation of prizes in fact is di⁄erent than Rosen￿ s well-known result (1986) according to
which the rewards in later stages must be higher than the rewards in earlier stages in order to sustain a
3Ryvkin (2009) also studied the phenomenon of fatigue but in a di⁄erent multi-stage tournament known as the best-of k
contest where he models fatigue as a reduction in a player￿ s probability of winning resulting from previous e⁄orts. He found
that agents are more likely to choose higher e⁄orts in the later stages of competition which is exactly opposite to our ￿ndings.
3non-decreasing e⁄ort along the elimination tournament.4
The designer￿ s goal, however, may not necessarily be to balance the players￿e⁄ort over the di⁄erent stages
of multi-stage tournaments. In many cases it can be to maximize the expected total e⁄ort. The optimal
allocation of prizes that maximizes the total e⁄ort exerted by the players has been studied in various multi-
stage tournaments. Fu and Lu (2009), for example, studied a multi-stage sequential elimination Tullock
contest, and showed that in the optimal contest, a designer who wishes to maximize the players￿total e⁄ort
should eliminate one contestant at each stage until the ￿nal, and the winner of the ￿nal takes the entire
prize sum. Moldovanu and Sela (2006) studied an elimination two-stage all-pay auction under incomplete
information and showed that it is optimal for a designer who wishes to maximize the expected total e⁄ort to
allocate the entire prize sum to the winner in the second (￿nal) stage of the tournament. In our round-robin
tournament, however, we show that if the designer wishes to maximize the expected total e⁄ort over all the
stages he should award a series of prizes that decreases over the n￿2 stages, with the prize in the last stage
being either smaller or larger than the previous prizes. The reason for this result is that the highest total
e⁄ort is obtained when each player exerts in each stage an e⁄ort that is equal to his budget of e⁄ort in that
stage such that he does not save e⁄ort for the next stages. Since the rate of saving e⁄ort is decreasing in
stages, the optimal incentive to prevent saving of e⁄ort should be decreasing as well and therefore the values
of the prizes are decreasing over all the stages except the last one.
The model most related to our round-robin tournament is the Colonel Blotto game (see, for example,
Roberson 2006 and Kvasov 2007) in which two players simultaneously distribute forces across n battle￿elds.
The payo⁄ of the Colonel Blotto game is the proportion of wins on the individual battle￿elds, while within
each battle￿eld, the player who allocates the higher level of force wins.5 In fact, our model without a
variable budget of e⁄ort, i.e., when the budget of e⁄ort is not reduced over the stages, is precisely equivalent
to the Colonel Blotto game. However, the variability of the players￿budgets of e⁄ort plays a key role in the
round-robin tournament we consider so that it is more complex than the Colonel Blotto game.
4Other works on allocation of resources in sequential contests include Konrad (2004), Warneryd (1998) and Klumpp and
Polborn (2006).
5Robson (2005) studied the Colonel Blotto Game where in each battle￿eld there is a Tullock contest, and Snyder (1989)
examined a related game where in each battle￿eld there is a contest of the type employed by Rosen (1986).
4The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces our round-robin tournament. Section 3
analyzes the players￿e⁄ort distribution over its stages. Sections 4 studies the allocation of prizes that yields
a balanced distribution of e⁄ort over the stages and Section 5 studies the optimal allocation of prizes that
yields the highest total e⁄ort. Section 6 concludes.
2 The model
Consider a round-robin tournament with n players (teams). The players compete against each other such
that in every stage j;1 ￿ j ￿ n ￿ 1; a player competes against a di⁄erent opponent in a Tullock contest for
a prize equal to pj. Thus, if players i and k compete against each other in stage j; player i exerts an e⁄ort
xi
j while player k exerts an e⁄ort xk














k: Each player has a budget of v units of e⁄ort to allocate across the
n ￿ 1 stages, with the budget of e⁄ort being reduced in the stages where for each e⁄ort unit that the player
exerts he loses ￿ units of e⁄ort from his budget, that is, vi
j+1 = vi
j ￿ ￿xi
j; 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1 where vi
j is player i￿ s
budget of e⁄ort in stage j. The player￿ s e⁄ort in each stage is smaller or equal to his budget of e⁄ort in that
stage. The only cost of e⁄ort for a player is the opportunity cost of having less e⁄ort for the other stages.
The contest designer may in￿ uence the players￿allocation of e⁄ort by awarding di⁄erent prizes for di⁄erent
stages, while each player wishes to maximize the sum of the prizes over the stages.
3 The allocation of e⁄ort
We assume ￿rst that the prize for winning (value for winning) a match is the same over all the stages and
that this value of the prize is normalized to be 1. It is important to note that in our round-robin tournament,
the relations between the prizes in the di⁄erent stages a⁄ect the players￿allocation of e⁄ort. In other words,
if we multiply the values of all the prizes by the same constant, the players￿allocation of e⁄ort will not be
changed. Thus, if a prize is equal to 1 in all the stages, each player will want to maximize the number of


















m , j = 1;:::;n ￿ 1
where e xi
j is the e⁄ort of the opponent of player i in stage j: Note that since there is no alternative value for
the player￿ s e⁄ort in the last stage, each player in this stage (stage n ￿ 1) exerts an e⁄ort that is equal to
his budget of e⁄ort. The solution of this maximization problem yields the players￿allocation of e⁄ort.
Proposition 1 In the round-robin tournament, a player￿ s equilibrium e⁄orts are as follows:
1) For ￿ < 1
n￿1;
xj = v(1 ￿ ￿)j￿1 , j ￿ 1;:::;n ￿ 1:
such that in every stage j, a player exerts an e⁄ort that is equal to his budget of e⁄ort in that stage.
2) For 1
n￿k+1 ￿ ￿ < 1




, j = 1;:::;k ￿ 1
xj =
v(n ￿ k)(1 ￿ ￿)j￿k
n ￿ 1
, j = k;:::;n ￿ 1
Proof. See Appendix.
The following example illustrates the equilibrium strategies given by Proposition 1 for the case of four
players.
Example 1 In the round-robin tournament with four players the players￿equilibrium e⁄orts are as follows:
x1 x2 x3
￿ < 1
3 v v(1 ￿ ￿) v(1 ￿ ￿)2
1
















In the above ￿gure we can see that for every value of ￿;x1(￿) ￿ x2(￿) ￿ x3(￿), namely, a player￿ s












Figure 1: The allocation of e⁄ort in the tournament with four players
By Proposition 1, as well as in the above example, the equilibrium strategy forms a non-increasing
sequence of e⁄ort xj ￿ xj+1 , j = 1;:::;n ￿ 1 over all the stages. In addition, for every level of ￿ there is
a critical stage j￿(￿) such that in all the stages j ￿ j￿(￿) a player exerts an e⁄ort equal to his budget of
e⁄ort in that stage, while in all the previous stages j < j￿; a player exerts the same e⁄ort which is smaller
than his budget of e⁄ort in that stage.6
A player￿ s total e⁄ort in the round-robin tournament with n players is given for every 1
n￿k+1 ￿ ￿ <
1








(n ￿ k)(1 ￿ ￿)j￿k
n ￿ 1
= v
(n ￿ 1) ￿ (n ￿ k)(1 ￿ ￿)n￿k
(n ￿ 1)￿
(2)
In our round-robin tournament with n+1 players for the same ￿ (note that k is now larger by 1 than in the
round-robin tournament with n players) the total e⁄ort of a player is
En+1 = v
n ￿ (n ￿ k)(1 ￿ ￿)n￿k
n￿
6Similar results are obtained by Che and Gale (1997) in one-stage Tullock contests where each player has a di⁄erent budget
constraint.
7The di⁄erence of a player￿ s total e⁄ort in both tournaments (with n and n ￿ 1 players) is
En+1 ￿ En = v
(n ￿ k)(1 ￿ ￿)n￿k
n(n ￿ 1)￿
> 0
Hence, a player￿ s total e⁄ort increases in the number of players.
4 Balance of e⁄ort
In the previous section, we showed that a player exerts the same e⁄ort in the ￿rst stages of the round-robin
tournament but he decreases his e⁄ort in the last stages. However, the designer of the tournament may wish
to balance the players￿e⁄ort in the tournament such that the players￿e⁄ort will be the same over all the
stages. Rosen (1986) showed in a di⁄erent form of an elimination tournament that the designer should award
a series of increasing rewards in order to sustain a non-decreasing e⁄ort along the tournament. In contrast,
we show that in our round-robin tournament, in order to balance the players￿e⁄ort over all the stages of the
tournament, the prize should be the same for all the stages except for the last one, which should be larger
than all the others.
If a player￿ s e⁄ort is the same over all the stages, we have
x = xn￿1 = v ￿ ￿
n￿2 X
j=1
xj = v ￿ ￿(n ￿ 2)x
Thus, the level of the e⁄ort in each stage is
x =
v
1 + ￿(n ￿ 2)
(3)
In order to balance the players￿e⁄ort for all the stages, the contest designer should award a prize in the last
stage that is su¢ ciently larger than the prizes in the other stages. Then, winning in the last stage becomes
very pro￿table for all the players and therefore they save e⁄ort for the last stage such that they do not
completely use their budgets of e⁄ort in the ￿rst n ￿ 2 stages. Consequently, if the contest designer awards
an identical prize normalized to 1 for each of the ￿rst n ￿ 2 stages and a prize pn￿1 for winning in the last
























m , j = 1;:::;n ￿ 1
where e xi
j is the e⁄ort of the opponent of player i in stage j: The solution of the above maximization problem
can be given by (3) for all the stages if the prize allocation is as follows.
Proposition 2 In the round-robin tournament, if the prize for winning each of the ￿rst n￿2 stages is equal
to 1 and the prize for winning the last stage is equal to 1
￿; each player exerts the same e⁄ort over all the
stages.
Proof. See Appendix.
It is of interest to examine the relation between balanced e⁄ort and total e⁄ort. The following result
demonstrates that the total e⁄ort cannot be maximized under the constraint of balanced e⁄ort.
Proposition 3 In the round-robin tournament if the players￿e⁄ort is the same over all the stages then the
players￿total e⁄ort is smaller than in the round-robin tournament when the prize for winning is the same
over all the stages.
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 3 invites the question of which allocation of prizes yields the highest total e⁄ort, which will
be the focus of the next section.
95 Maximization of total e⁄ort
In this section we assume that the contest designer wishes to maximize the players￿expected total e⁄ort.






xj ￿ v ￿ ￿
j￿1 X
m=1
xm , j = 1;:::;n ￿ 1
where xj is a player￿ s e⁄ort in stage j. The designer can in￿ uence the players￿allocations of e⁄ort by
awarding di⁄erent prizes for winning in the di⁄erent stages. For stage j;;j = 1;:::;n ￿ 1, let pj be the prize

















m , j = 1;:::;n ￿ 1
The following result provides the minimal values of the prizes for winning that encourage the players to
exert the highest possible e⁄ort in every stage of the tournament.





(1 ￿ ￿)n￿j￿1 , j = 1;:::;n ￿ 2
Proof. See Appendix.
By Proposition 4, the sequence of the prizes for winning in the ￿rst n ￿ 2 stages is decreasing such that
pj =
pj+1
1￿￿ ,1 ￿ j ￿ n￿2: However, the value of the prize in the last stage might be larger or smaller than the
other prizes and this relation depends on the parameter ￿. For su¢ ciently small values of ￿ (low fatigue),
all the prizes for winning in the n ￿ 2 ￿rst stages will be smaller than the prize in the last stage, and for
su¢ ciently large values of ￿ (high fatigue) all the prizes in the ￿rst n￿2 stages will be larger than the prize
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Figure 2: The optimal values of the prizes in the tournament with four players
Example 2 In the round-robin tournament with four players in order to obtain the highest total e⁄ort the








It can be easily veri￿ed that p1 ￿ p2: Moreover, by Figure 2 we can see that the di⁄erence between these
prizes p1 ￿ p2 increases in ￿, and both prizes p1 and p2 are smaller than p3 for small values of ￿ but are
larger than p3 for high values.
We can see here the con￿ ict between the two di⁄erent goals of the contest designer: on the one hand, he
wishes to balance the players￿e⁄ort, but on the other, he wishes to maximize their e⁄ort. By Proposition
4, in order to maximize the total e⁄ort, the minimal value of all the prizes in the ￿rst n ￿ 2 stages should
be ￿
(1￿￿)n￿2; where the value of the prize in the last stage is equal to 1. Then we obtain that the the ratio






￿, which is not enough to
balance the player￿ s e⁄ort over all the stages of the tournament.
6 Concluding remarks
We studied a round-robin tournament with n symmetric players where in each of the n ￿ 1 stages, a player
competes against a di⁄erent opponent in the Tullock contest. We showed that by awarding an identical prize
for winning in all the stages except the last one in which a larger prize is awarded, the contest designer can
balance the players￿e⁄ort allocation, such that each player￿ s e⁄ort will be the same over all the stages. We
also showed that by allocating a series of decreasing prizes for winning over the ￿rst n￿2 stages, the contest
designer can maximize the players￿expected total e⁄ort. These results were obtained for symmetric players
who have the same values of winning in the round-robin tournament. The generalization of these results to
an asymmetric round-robin tournament where players have di⁄erent values of winning could be interesting,
but the analysis would be extremely di¢ cult to carry out.
7 Appendix
7.1 Proof of Proposition 1


















m , j = 1;:::;n ￿ 1
where e xi
j is the e⁄ort of the opponent of player i in stage j: Let 1
n￿k+1 ￿ ￿ < 1
n￿k;k = 2;3;:::;n ￿ 1; and
assume that the last n ￿ k constraints are binding while the ￿rst k ￿ 1 constraints are not (this assumption






































j + e xi
j)2 ￿ ￿j ￿ ￿
n￿1 X
m=j+1








m = 0 , j = k;::::;n ￿ 1





, j = 1;:::;k ￿ 1 (7)
Then by (7), the ￿rst constraint in the maximization problem (5) v
(n￿1)￿ < v is satis￿ed i⁄ ￿ > 1
n￿1
and the second constraint v
(n￿1)￿ < v ￿ ￿ v
(n￿1)￿ =
v(n￿2)￿
(n￿1)￿ is satis￿ed i⁄ ￿ > 1
n￿2: Similarly the constraint
j;3 ￿ j ￿ k ￿ 1 , v
(n￿1)￿ < v ￿ (j ￿ 1)￿ v
(n￿1)￿ is satis￿ed i⁄ ￿ > 1
n￿j: Thus, our assumption that
1
n￿k+1 ￿ ￿ < 1
n￿k is a necessary and su¢ cient condition that exactly the ￿rst k ￿ 1 constraints are not
binding.
If the last n ￿ k constraints are binding, then by (7) we obtain that player i￿ s e⁄orts in the last n ￿ k
stages are given by
xi




(n ￿ k)v(1 ￿ ￿)j￿k
n ￿ 1
j = k;:::;n ￿ 1
Using the ￿rst order conditions (6) we can see that the last n ￿ k constraints are binding since for all





































In the above calculation of ￿j ; j = k;:::;n ￿ 1; we used the symmetry of the players, namely, xi
j = e xi
j





j = k;:::;n ￿ 1:
Similarly to the above analysis, if ￿ ￿ 1
n￿1 we obtain that all the n ￿ 1 constraints in the maximization
problem (5) are binding, and the solution of player i￿ s maximization problem is:
13xi




m = v(1 ￿ ￿)j￿1 1 ￿ j ￿ n ￿ 1:
Q:E:D:
7.2 Proof of Proposition 2
























m , j = 1;:::;n ￿ 1
where e xi
j is the e⁄ort of the opponent of player i in stage j: We assume that all the ￿rst n￿2 constraints are
not binding but the last constraint is binding (this assumption will be con￿rmed in the following). Then,













n￿1 + e xi
n￿1
￿ ￿n￿1(xi













j + e xi








n￿1 + e xi
n￿1)2 ￿ ￿n￿1 = 0
From the comparison of the ￿rst n ￿ 2 ￿rst-order conditions and the symmetry of the players xi
j = e xi
j,
j = 1;:::;n ￿ 2 we have
xi
1 = xi
2 = ::: = xi
n￿2










14By the last-order condition given by (9) we obtain that
x = xi




j = v ￿ ￿(n ￿ 2)x
Thus, the level of the e⁄ort in each stage is given by
x =
v
1 + ￿(n ￿ 2)
In order to show that all the ￿rst n ￿ 2 constraints in the maximization problem (8) are not binding, it is




1 + ￿(n ￿ 2)






1 + ￿(n ￿ 2)





1 + ￿(n ￿ 2)
4￿v
> 0
the last constraint is binding accordingly to our assumption. Q:E:D:
7.3 Proof of Proposition 3
By (2), each player￿ s total e⁄ort in a tournament with equal prizes over the stages (each prize is normalized
to be 1) is
Ep(k) = v
(n ￿ 1) ￿ (n ￿ k)(1 ￿ ￿)n￿k
(n ￿ 1)￿
where 1
n￿k+1 ￿ ￿ < 1
n￿k; k = 2;:::;n ￿ 1 ( for k = 1, 0 ￿ ￿ < 1
n￿1):
By (3), each player￿ s total e⁄ort in a tournament with equal e⁄orts over the stages (the prizes are




1 + ￿(n ￿ 2)
For k = n ￿ 1 we have
Ep(k) ￿ Ee = v(




1 + ￿(n ￿ 2)
) = v
(n ￿ 2)(1 ￿ ￿)2
(n ￿ 1)￿(1 + ￿(n ￿ 2))
> 0
Suppose that Ep(k)￿Ee > 0 for all n￿1 ￿ k ￿ e k. We will show by induction that this inequality holds for
15e k ￿ 1: The di⁄erence between a player￿ s e⁄orts for k = e k ￿ 1 is
Ep(e k ￿ 1) ￿ Ee = v(




1 + ￿(n ￿ 2)
)
= v(




1 + ￿(n ￿ 2)
) +
(1 ￿ ￿)(￿(n ￿ e k) + ￿ ￿ 1)
(n ￿ 1)￿
By the induction assumption, we need to show that
(1 ￿ ￿)(￿(n ￿ e k) + ￿ ￿ 1)
(n ￿ 1)￿
￿ 0
Thus, it is su¢ cient to show that
￿(n ￿ e k + 1) ￿ 1 ￿ 0
Since by de￿nition 1
n￿k+1 ￿ ￿ < 1
n￿k we obtain that the last inequality holds. Q:E:D:
7.4 Proof of Proposition 4
We ￿rst show that the maximal e⁄ort of each player is obtained when the highest possible e⁄ort is exerted
in every stage, namely, each player exerts an e⁄ort in every stage that is equal to his budget of e⁄ort in that






xj ￿ v ￿ ￿
j￿1 X
m=1
xm , j = 1;:::;n ￿ 1
We assume that all the constraints are binding (this assumption will be con￿rmed in the following). The




xj ￿ ￿1(x1 ￿ v) ￿
n￿1 X
j=2




where ￿j;j = 1;:::;n ￿ 1 are the Lagrange multipliers. The ￿rst-order conditions are:
dL1
dxj
= 1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿j ￿ ￿
n￿1 X
m=j+1
￿m = 0 , j = 1;:::;n ￿ 1
dL1
d￿j
= xj ￿ v + ￿
j￿1 X
m=1
xm = 0 , j = 1;::::;n ￿ 1
16If all the constraints are binding, the solution of this system of equations is
xj = v(1 ￿ ￿)j￿1 , j = 1;:::;n ￿ 1
￿j = (1 ￿ ￿)n￿j , j = 1;:::;n ￿ 1
Since ￿j > 0 for all j = 1;:::;n ￿ 1 we obtain the desired result.
Next, we will ￿nd the value of prizes such that each player will exert in every stage an e⁄ort that is equal


















m , j = 1;:::;n ￿ 1
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m = 0 , j = 1;::::;n ￿ 1
If all the constraints are binding, player i￿ s e⁄orts over all the stages are given by:
xi




m = v(1 ￿ ￿)j￿1 , j = 1;:::;n ￿ 1 (12)
By (11) and (12) we obtain that
￿n￿1 =
1
4v(1 ￿ ￿)n￿2 > 0
and by induction we obtain that if for all n ￿ 2 ￿ j < 1
￿j =
pj
4v(1 ￿ ￿)j￿1 ￿
￿
4v(1 ￿ ￿)n￿2 =







pj+1(1 ￿ ￿)n￿(j+1)￿1 ￿ ￿
4v(1 ￿ ￿)n￿2
where
￿j+1 ￿ 0 i⁄ pj+1 ￿
￿
(1 ￿ ￿)n￿(j+1)￿1




(1 ￿ ￿)n￿j￿1 , j = 1;:::;n ￿ 2
all the constraints in the maximization problem (10) are binding. Q:E:D:
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